Portland State University

PDXScholar
City Club of Portland

Oregon Sustainable Community Digital Library

8-24-1979

City Club of Portland Bulletin vol. 60, no. 13
(1979-8-24)
City Club of Portland (Portland, Or.)

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/oscdl_cityclub
Part of the Urban Studies Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
City Club of Portland (Portland, Or.), "City Club of Portland Bulletin vol. 60, no. 13 (1979-8-24)" (1979). City
Club of Portland. 333.
https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/oscdl_cityclub/333

This Bulletin is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in City Club of Portland
by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more accessible:
pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

NEWSPAPER SECOND CLASS POSTAGE PAID AT PORTLAND, OREGON

City
Porland

Club of

BULLETIN
Portland, Oregon

Vol. 60, No. 13

Benson Hotel, Mayfair Room

12:00 Noon

Friday, August 24, 1979

THE SPEAKER:

CHARLES JORDAN
Commissioner of Public Safety
City of Portland

THE TOPIC:

REDISCOVERING THE CITY
For the City of Portland. at least, the flight of residents from city to suburb is reversing.
People are discovering city neighborhoods as attractive and exciting places to live.
CommissionerJordan is responsible for a number of City bureaus which have a signifi-

cant impact on the quality of life in Portland. including the Police Bureau, Bureau of
Neighborhood Environment. and Metropolitan Human Relations Commission. Factors
affecting the livability of Portland include the safety of its citizens, the strength of its
neighborhoods. the relationships among divergent groups and lifestyles, and the confidence

of Portland residents in City government.
The Commissioner will talk about the activities of his bureaus, and the ways in which
those services can operate to attract people to the City and encourage residents to remain
here.

PRINTED HEREIN FOR DISCUSSION AND ACTION NEXT FRIDAY, AUGUST31:

Report on Coordination Among Agencies Involved in Disaster Planning
in the Portland Metropolian Area
(see back page for details)

"To inform its members and the community in public matters and to
arouse in them a realization of the obligation of citizenship."
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REPORT ON

COORDINATION AMONG AGENCIES INVOLVED IN DISASTER
PLANNING IN THE PORTLAND METROPOLITAN AREA
To the Board of Governors,
The City Club of Portland:

i. INTRODUCTION

Your Committee was charged to study the Portland metropolitan area's preparedness
to take prompt and effective action on a community-wide basis in the event of a disaster.
Your Committee was directed to define "disaster" and to review organizations, facili-

ties and other resources available to respond to a disaster in a coordinated fashion. Your
Committee was further directed to identify inadequacies in the current disaster plans and
make recommmendations to remedy any defects so identified.
A. Disaster Defined

II. SCOPE OF STUDY

Your Committee has defined a disaster as any emergency (either actual or imminent)
which cannot be controlled by a single municipal department (such as fire or police)

working in routine coordination with other emergency related agencies. Such a possible
disaster may include, but not be limited to, unusually severe weather, an uncontrollable
fire, flood, earthquake, pollution of the city's water supply, or radiation release at a
nuclear power facility.
By way of example, the December 1978 crash of a passenger airliner in East Portland, although tragic, was not a disaster by your Committee's definition. On the other

hand, the January 1979 ice storm approximated a disaster, both in terms of the number
of people affected and the strain on the operations of local private and public agencies

involved.
B. Geographic Limitations

This report deals with disasters occurring in metropolitan Portland and thus is related
only to portions of Multnomah, Washington and Clackamas Counties.
C. Depth of Study

Your Committee has reviewed the plans of public and private agencies which would
be called upon to respond in the event of a disaster. This report deals mainly with the

City of Portland, not only because the population is concentrated in Portland, but also
because Portland's disaster plan was more developed than other plans at the time of this
writing. Further, the City owns the metropolitan area's largest and most complex communications facility.
Your Committee's concern has been confined to the overall coordination of these
plans and the Committee has not passed judgment as to the adequacy of every detail in
every plan.
The reader should be advised that many of the disaster plans reviewed by the Committee, especially those of the City of Portland, are undergoing continual adjustment.

However, for the purpose of concluding this report, not every recent change in those
plans has been noted here.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Disaster Preparedness
Present disaster planning by government agencies and citizen groups traces its origins
to World War II when strong fears of enemy air raids sparked the formation of a civil
defense system. Activities included patrolling the streets by air raid wardens during prac-
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tice blackouts. With the passage of time, practice exercises became less frequent and the
system was dismantled after the war. The growing atomic capabilities of Russia gave rise
to renewed interest in civil preparedness. This interest led to the Civil Defense Act of
1949 and the subsequent emphasis on fallout shelters to protect the populace against a
Russian attack.
As the years passed, the once frosty East-West relationship began to thaw and the

sense of military urgency gave way to a feeling of guarded trust. The civil defense
authorities then assumed secondary responsibilities for dealing with natural as well as
military disasters. In 1962 the Columbus Day storm put Portland's civil defense organi-

zation to its first major test and for various reasons, including the lack of adequate
authority, the organization was found wanting and was abolished shortly afterward. It

was not replaced for nearly a decade. The successor agency in Portland was established
in June of 1973 and is called the Offce of Emergency Services, a title that reflects concern with peace time disasters, whether natural or man-made.
At the state level, the State Offce of Emergency Services traces its origins back to the
legislative session of 1949. The agency began operations in 1951 as a civil defense organization and was given its present name in 1967.

B. The City's Organization
Portland's Offce of Emergency Services was created by Ordinance No. 136719, Title
15 of the City Code which provides for a coordinator of emergency services. This coordinator reports to the mayor, who can declare an emergency. In establishing the Offce

of Emergency Services the City Council directed the new agency to prepare a basic
emergency services plan for the City in conformity with State and Federal intent as provided by ORS Chapter 401 and Public Law 81-920. The resulting plan is one of 37 (34

county plans and those of Portland, Eugene, and Springfield) of which those of Portland,
Washington County, Clackamas County and Multnomah County, have been approved by
the State of Oregon. Approval by the State qualifies local jurisdictions to receive some
federal monies and federal surplus emergency equipment.
C. County Organizations
The Multnomah County unit wa.s formed in April
1974 by Executive Order No. 49.
Like its Portland counterpart, the county agency was set up to fit the pattern established
by state and federal precedent. Originally called the Offce of Emergency Services, the
county agency was re-named the Offce of Emergency Preparedness in the fall of 1977
to avoid confusion with the soon-to-be-formed Offce of Emergency Medical Services.
The Offce receives its direct authority from the Multnomah County Sheriff, Department
of Public Safety. The Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners has the sole

authority to declare a formal disaster and direct the response.

In Washington County the Director of Emergency Planning reports to the Sheriff,
who may declare a state of emergency, and, if the situation warrants, may recommend
to the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners that a disaster be declared.
Similarly, the Chairman of the Clackamas County Commission has such authority
to declare an emergency and coordinate control in a disaster situation.

Additionally, within each of these political subdivisions there necessarily exist lines
of authority within the major departments which would be most affected by a disaster.
Thus, for example, the fire and police bureau chiefs would still exercise considerable
administrative and practical authority over their respective departments. As might be
expected, the mayor or county commissioners must, to a large degree, rely on the expertise and experience of their department heads to coordinate an effective response.

The extent of authority within each political jurisdiction appears to be blurred. Similarly, there appears to be no express delineation of authoritative lines between political

jurisdictions, for example, between the Mayor of Portland and the Chairman of the
Multnomah County Commission.
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In spite of the lack of such definitive lines of authority, some public offcials interviewed by this Committee appear to be confident that effective coordination among over-

lapping personnel would not be a significant problem in a disaster situation. This point
wil be discussed later in this report.
The offces of disaster planning within the Portland metropolitan area are funded on
a 50-50 basis between the city or county and the federal government. The federal government has committed funding for 50 percent of the cost to develop a plan, but your
Committee is not certain that the federal government wil continue this commitment
once a plan has been developed. The various disaster planning activities of political
subdivisions were staffed and funded for 1977 as follows:
Annual Budget
Staff Positions
Political Sub-division
Coordinator
City of Portland
$ 40,322.00
Secretary (Vi time)
Coordinator
Multnomah County
Resources Manager
Public Education Coordinator
93,000.00
Secretary

Washington County

Coordinator
Secretary

Clackamas County

Coordinator ( part-time)

Secretary (part-time)
Radio Tech (part-time)

Total Tri-County Budget

36,000.00

30.000.00

$199,322.00

iV. OVERVIEW OF ORGANIZATIONS AND RESOURCES

A. City of Portland
1. Offce of Emergency Services

Disaster planning in the City of Portland is directed from the offce of the Mayor
and headed by an Emergency Services Coordinator (Coordinator) appointed by the
Mayor.
2. The Plan

The Coordinator is responsible for developing an overall disaster plan for the City of
Portland. The Coordinator has no direct authority over any agencies (such as the Fire
Bureau) that might play a role in responding to a disaster (see emergency organization

chart, Appendix A). The Coordinator encourages and assists separate agencies in developing their own departmental plans.

The primary purpose of the plan is to provide a basis for the development of the
City's emergency organization and to outline the basic operational concepts to be used
when coping with major emergencies.
The Plan states that agencies and organizations having emergency responsibility are
to prepare and continuously update service support plans, operating procedures, and

checklists detailing the utilization and disposition of their resources in a major emergency.
The Plan calls for four stages of a disaster reaction which are listed below.
a. Possible Emergencyl

When an organization or agency becomes aware that an emergency is imminent, the
involved agency wil place its own emergency plan into operation as the situation warrants and wil notify the Offce of Emergency Services. The Coordinator will determine

what resources might be needed and advise the citizenry of developments. A possible
1 Headings taken from the Basic Emergency Services Plan, City of Portland, April 1976, which
was the latest adopted plan at the writing of this report.
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emergency would' exist when conditions such as a continuing and excessive rainfall or
an unusual rapid snow melt would post a threat to the community.

b. Expected Emergency
An expected emergency begins when the situation indicates "when" rather than "if"
emergency conditions exist. At this point, the Mayor would declare an emergency and
assume command of all city agencies. The populace would be alerted, appropriate emergency plans and resources would be activated. The Mayor also may activate the City's
command center at Kelly Butte (see page 60) and designated agency leaders would
assemble at the center.
c. Onset of Emergency

When the disaster strikes, all resources of manpower and material wil be directed as
needed by the Mayor. When the City expends its resources or when that possibility

becomes evident, the Mayor may call upon the county and/ or the Governor for assistance such as requesting the National Guard, or possibly the help of a federal agnecy.
d. Post Emergency
Each agency will be directed to take action to assist in the restoration of services and
aid citizens who have been affected by the disaster. '
3. Role of City Agencies Involved in Disaster Response

The agencies which would assume the major responsibility during a disaster would be
the Police, Fire, Water and Public Works Departments, each of which has its own disaster plan. These departmental plans outline a course of action in an emergency which
is largely contained by their own organization, with only informal coordination with

other agencies which also may be affected or whose assistance may be required. Since
there is no way to predict what specific disaster or combination of disasters may strike
this area at a given time, specific plans to cover every contingency obviously cannot be
developed.
a. Police Bureau

The primary responsibility of the Police Bureau is to safeguard lives and property.
The Police have primary responsibility in cases of evacuation, law enforcement, and
public warning. The Portland Police Bureau also has tacit arrangements with Multnomah
County Sheriff and the Oregon State Police for mutual assistance if and when it is required. In addition, the Police have understandings with the Fire Bureau so that they can
work in harmony on normal day-to-day emergency situations.2
b. Fire Bureau
The primary responsibility of the Fire Bureau is fire fighting, radiological emergency.
and rescue. It has secondary responsibility for evacuation and warning. The department

has written, well-developed and frequently used backup agreements with neighboring fire
districts.
c. Bureau of Water Works

The primary responsibility of the Water Bureau is to provide an adequate supply of
potable water and "to restore utilities." The Water Bureau does not participate in urban
disaster training, and does not participate in "disaster exercises" that are conducted by
other bureaus; however, they do participate in annual drills concerned with the control of
wild fire in the Bull Run watershed. The Water Bureau's plans note that, "these exercises
are conducted annually and consist almost entirely of classroom and demonstration work

with little or no field exercise involved."
d. Public Works

The primary responsibility of the Public Works Department as outlined in its emer-

gency plan is to "protect private and public property." As this plan reads, it also is
responsible for such functions as waste water treatment, and refuse disposaL. Although

2A "normal day-to-day emergency" differs from this Committee's definition of a "disaster."
See page 53 of this report. .
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a part of the Department's major day-to-day responsibility, no mention is made of street

or access route restoration in the event of an emergency.
In the case of limited emergencies, the Public Works plan provides for its own
emergency command center. Should the emergency develop into a "declared" disaster,
the command center would move to Kelly Butte.
The plan developed for Public Works also calls for participation in rescue operations
with the Fire Bureau. The plan does not mention just how this cooperative effort is to take
place and does not provide for drills or training programs relating to rescue operations.
Public Works, along with other City support services, has primary responsibility for
the "restoration of utilities;" however, none of the plans cover any responsibilities of this
type and it does not appear that any planning or coordination exists among these departments and the private utilities.
e. Support Services

The City of Portland Plan has assigned duties to other City agencies such as the
Bureau of Electronic Services, Bureau of Financial Affairs, Damage Analysis Team,
Public Information Offcer, Bureau of Fleet Management, qty Attorney, Bureau of
Parks, Bureau of Personnel Services, and Bureau of Buildings. (See Appendix B of this
report. )

These support service agencies have some general guidelines as to how and to whom
they are to report in the event of a disaster. In some cases these plans are quite specific.
For example, the Bureau of Electronic Services "shall provide the City with communications by engineering, establishing and maintaining radio and telephone communica-

tions," and the Damage Analysis Team is to "collect, record and plot field damage information in order to make a damage estimate." In checking with private utility companies.
the Committee finds very little if any prearranged or detailed coordination among the
utilities and these support agencies.

B. Utilties
The life of our City is heavily dependent on services provided by our local utility
companies. The ability of these organizations to continue uninterrupted service during a
disaster is criticaL. In checking with Oregon's Public Utility Commissoner, the Committee
learned that there were no specific PUC requirements that a utility have a prepared disaster plan. However, the utility would be subject to criticism if it were unable to respond
properly ih a disaster situation.
1. Local Power Companies

After the October i 962 wind storm, Portland General Electric Company (PGE)
developed and has maintained on its own initiative a formal disaster plan for its own
organization. Its plan creates a separate disaster command with formalized lines of
authority. In the event of an emergency, its resources can be mobliized and its plan

activated by the Chairman of the Board or his authorized delegate. The plan outlines
minor emergencies which can be handled solely by PGE and those of a more serious
nature which would require the assistance of other utilities in accordance with formal

mutual assistance agreements. .

PGE has substantial resources available to it in the event of a disaster, including a
radio communications system with an auxiliary power supply which can reach approximately 500 of its mobile units. PGE has a helicopter and a heliport which could be used
to survey damaged areas and transport emergency offcials to command centers, although
no formal arrangements have been made with the City or the Counties to utilize these
resources. There is no direct radio communication between PGE's command center and
Kelly Butte.

As soon as a disaster strikes, the course of action taken is determined by projecting
an estimate of total damage based on a two-hour survey that would cover ten percent of
its system. This information would of course be of vital concern to the Mayor and his
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staff at Kelly Butte, yet no formal arrangement has been made between the City and the
utilities to transmit this information.
In checking with executives of Pacific Power & Light Company (PP&L), the Committee fids that a similar well-developed emergency plan exists, that there are tremen-

dous private resources available that would be very useful to the metropolitan area, and
that PP&L too, has not been requested by any local authority to integrate its plans with
a master disaster plan.
2. Pacific Northwest Bell

Pacific Northwest Bell (PNB) has developed an extensive emergency manual detailing procedures to be followed in the event of major disruptions to the phone system.

These procedures are tested at least once annually through practice drils to insure a high
level of readiness to react to a disaster. The first major step in PNB's emergency plan is
to set up emergency control centers. This action may be taken on a local or statewide l

basis and is the method of insuring the distribution of key personnel and supplies. PNB
has stockpiles of equipment, for emergency only, stored at strategic locations. PNB has
a cooperative agreement with other telephone companies throughout the country to
supply needed staff and supplies should an emergency strike. In past emergencies

throughout the country such arrangements have provided the required backup resources.
In the event of a major emergency or disruption, PNB will institute line load control
and! or selective service restoration. In an emergency there is a tendency for everyone to

use the phone. Left unchecked, the over use of a phone system could render it totally
useless. Line load control is a system of selectively eliminating the ability of phones to
call out in order to insure that phones directly relating to health and welfare wil remain
usable. Selective restoration is a procedure whereby key phones related to police, fie,
health, and government authorities are restored first. Both line load control and selective
restoration wil insure that priority is placed on the phones most needed during and
immediately following a disaster. It should be noted here that while selective restoration
wil allow certain phones to call out, an overload on the phone system could seriously

retard the general public's ability to report to Kelly Butte Command Center situations
related directly to the disaster at hand.
In the event phone operations could not be restored immediately at an important

geographical point, PNB could dispatch mobile telephone cars to that location to restore
service.

It is planned that eventually all phone lines wil be placed underground and this
arrangement should provide more reliability in the event of surface disruptions. Underground cables could, however, make the system more vulnerable to floods and earthquakes.

C. Other Emergency Services
There exist other resources which, depending upon the nature of the situation, would
be available in the event of a disaster. For example, the manpower and resources of the
National Guard could be made available by the Governor should a disaster reach major
proportions.
The Port of Portland has a formal disaster plan, developed primarily for emergency

situations at the Portland International Airport. In addition, the Port has mutual aid
agreements with surrounding fire and police services and has, at least indirectly, a communication tie-in with Kelly Butte. Frequent drills are held at the Airport to test the
effectiveness of the Port's disaster plan.

The Committee has not made in-depth studies to determine, as an example, if the
National Guard has had adequate disaster training or if there is an adequate food supply
available from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The Committee concerned itself with
the organization of these resources and how they would be pressed into service should
the occasion arise.
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D. Volunteer Organizations

Portland has a large number of volunteer organizations such as the Red Cross, Volunteers of America, St. Vincent de Paul, Mennonites, Seventh Day Adventists, Latter Day
Saints, Salvation Army, and others. The Red Cross has assumed a leadership role in a

committee of 15 relief-oriented agencies to provide assistance in the event of a disaster.
This group meets monthly to discuss and update its collective resources and capabilities.
In the event of a disaster, the Red Cross command center would be activated and the
resources of these organizations would be directed from there. Once again, no direct
radio communication exists between the Red Cross command center and Kelly Butte.
The question was raised about the desirability of forming additional volunteer organizations. It was the unanimous opinion of both your Committee and those witnesses we
interviewed that it is virtually impossible to create a special purpose organization solely
formed to respond to disasters, in the absence of a sustained national threat such as war.
Furthermore, if attempted, such an organization could actually become counterproductive.

E. Medical Staff

The MuItnomah County Medical Offcer is under contract with the City of Portland
to provide medical services in emergency situations. In the event of a disaster or possible
disaster, the medical offcer would activate what is known as H.E.A.R. (Hospital Emergency Administrative Radio). This system, headquartered at Providence Hospital, would

survey all the hospitals in the Portland area and determine the resources currently avail-

able, e.g., beds, surgical capabilities, blood, staff, etc. A command center would be estab-

lished at Providence Hospital from which doctors, emergency units, resources, and
patients would be directed.
During the course of the Committee's study one member visited the command center
at Providence Hospital and observed a practice drill of the H.E.AR. system. A simulated
disaster with several hundred injuries was developed and the command center activated.

The drill reflected several deficiencies in cquipment and pcrsonnel that were at once
recognized and should be rectified. The Committee's H.E.A.R. observer was favorably

impressed with this organization, particularly with its interest in having organized drill,
within the system. Given the proper community support it could play a major role in
minimizing the effects of a disaster.
Two emergencies last year demonstrated continuing weaknesses in the H.E.A.R. system. A multiple injury fire in March i 978, which was not of disaster proportions, emphasized the need for careful coordination and better communication.3 The December

1978 emergency involving the crash of a commcrcial airliner showed that an inadequate
radio communication system stil existed. Had the emcrgency been of greater proportions.
unnecessary suffering and loss of life could have become a real possibility with the present
communication system.4
Leaders of the H.E.A.R. system have had some contact with the Emergency Services

Coordinators of the various political jurisdictions in the Portland area and, in the fall of

1978, direct radio communication capability was established between H.E.A.R. and the
Kelly Butte Command Center. However, there seems to be some confusion as to exactly
what role H.E.A.R. would play in working with each of the political subdivisions in the
event of a disaster. For example, the Director of Emergency Services at Providence Hospital told your Committee that the City's disaster plan has never been made available to
him. The leaders of H.E.AR. indicated they would like to move their command center
to Kelly Butte in the event of a disaster. Since Kelly Butte is a City-sponsored facility
and the H.E.AR. system operates under the auspices of the Multnomah County Medical
Offcer, the authority for such a move lies with the City.
3 The Oregonian, March 8, 1978

40regoii ¡oumal, January 31,1979
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F. The Kelly Butte Communications Center
The City of Portland, through its Bureau of Emergency Communications, operates an
underground command and communication center at Kelly Butte in Southeast Portland.

From this center emergency calls from citizens of Portland, Gresham, Troutdale and
Multnomah County are received and processed, and police and ambulance services are
dispatched. Facilities for command of emergency operations also are provided.
This center is served by two sets of land telephone lines which would guarantee its
continued operation should one set of lines be disrupted. In the event that both lines were
disrupted, it would not be possible for the general public to make emergency telephone
communications to this center.
While offcials of Multnomah, Clackamas, and Washington counties would be invited
to use the Kelly Buttc command center in the event of a disaster, no formal agreements
have been made because the City is reluctant to authorize another political jurisdiction to
activate the City's command center without approval of the Mayor. As a result, Multnomah County has plans to establish its own command center in the basement of the
Multnomah County Courthouse in downtown Portland. Should this proposal become a
reality, it is questionable that all the resources in the metropoltan area could be effec-

tively drawn together in a coordinated fashion to minimize the effects of a disaster.
While the Kelly Butte facility appears to be an ideal location for a command center,
it may be diffcult to transport quickly key offcials to the center if disruptions to thoroughfares and! or traffc jams prevent a reasonably quick assembly. A possible solution

would be to arrange for helicopter transpotration to Kelly Butte for authorized personneL. While helicopter service is available from private and public agencies, no known
agreements or requests have been made for use of these resources.
V. DISCUSSION
Whenevcr a largc metropolitan community overlaps several political jurisdictions, an

attcmpt to coordinatc an overall plan of any kind becomes diffcult and the very nature
of thc situation lends itself to confusion, frustration, and finally noncooperation.
Disaster planning within the Portland metropolitan area is no exception. In its re-

scarch, this Committec found many examples of obstacles to achieving a coordinated
plan. Somc cxamplcs arc summarized below:

1. Thc Kclly Buttc Command Center is controlled by the City of Portland, which is
unwilling to give complete frcedom of access to Multnomah County.
2. It is thc Committcc's opinion that there are feelings of ill will between the Emergency Scrvices Coordinators of M ultnomuh County and the City of Portland. This atmospherc precludes effcctivc cooperation and coordination of the programs.

3. During an important drill of thc HEAR system, only the Multnomah County
Emcrgcncy Services Coordinator was present.
4. Long dclays result in funding programs or capital items that serve all the jurisdic-

tions bccausc no mcans or formula has been developed to negotiate cost sharing of these
ovcrlapping programs. As a result some desirable programs and additions and equipment
never matcrialize.

5. The overlapping, duplicating, and competing governmental jurisdictions tend to

frustrate private organizations such as the Rcd Cross in their efforts to provide services.
During the ice storm of 1979 the Red Cross felt they had the capacity to provide the
highest quality temporary shelters. They were frustrated whcn other shelters were set up
in Multnomah County without any coordination with them.
Considering the results of the Committee's research, discussions and interviews, the
lack of overall authority emerged as the crucial weakness in developing and implementing
disaster plans. The Committee considered several alternative solutions which included an
intergovernmental agreement to establish one jurisdiction as the party responsible for
disaster planning; using the existing structure but improving communications and co-
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operation amongst the various agencies; withholding financial support from recalcitrant
jurisdictions; and establishing the power in an entity which would be charged with the
responsibility to develop plans and assume authority in the event of a declared disaster.
After considering the research and the evidence contained in this report, the Committee believes the best solution would be to vest in a regional body the full power to

develop, test, and implement a disaster response plan in the metropolitan area of
Portland.
Vi. CONCLUSIONS

1. Most public and private agencies appear reasonably well-prepared to respond to a

disaster on an individual basis. However, based on the definition of a disaster as an
emergency requiring extraordinarily coordinated action by more than one agency, this
finding, by itself, offers citizens little comfort.

2. No overall plan exists to coordinate all organizations and resources that may be
needed to effectively respond to a disaster.

Apart from the example of area fire departments, this Committee found litte evidence of clear written agreements among organizations of the sort that would avoid
duplication of effort, confusion and misunderstandings when a disaster strikes. While
many offcials could explain informal arrangements and understandings that they had
with other organizations, the other groups involved did not always have the same understanding of the arrangements.
No plan could be considered complete without full coordination with public utilities,
medical relief and volunteer organizations, all of which provide vital services to the community. Most agency representatives were confident that in the event of a disaster all
resources would be made available and mobilized, and that concern for the public welfare
would insure compromise and organization.

Your Committee believes that oral or informal agreements and a spirit of good will
are inadequate to provide the needed coordination to respond to a disaster.
3. The absence of inter-agency practice drils is a serious impediment to overall disaster planning in the metropolitan area.

While some individual agencies have tested their own plans with practice drills (e.g.,
simulated airplane crash at Portland International Airport) no major inter-agency drils
have taken place on a metropolitan-wide scale. Such drills are necessary to evaluate the
effectiveness of a total response to a disaster situation, to locate and solve problems which
invariably occur, and to familiarize oftentimes parochial agencies with their counterparts.
4. There is inadequate coordination among the four political jurisdictions in the
metropolitan area involved in disaster planning (City of Portland, Washington, Clackamas
and Multnomah counties).

Considering the diffculties of bringing four separate political jurisdictions to some
kind of agreement, it is not likely any single comprehensive plan will ever be developed
under the present structure.
5. There is an over-reliance on the telephone for emergency communications. Satis-

factory radio communication does not exist as an alternative among the various resource
agencies.

6. Proper coordination in a disaster situation requires the centralized presence of key
personnel. Under current disaster plans, no provision exists for alternatives to surface
transportation to the command center at Kelly Butte.

Summary
The Committee concludes that the present situation is so serious that an effective
response to a disaster would be too much to expect.
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ViI. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Committee recommends that the Governor introduce, and the legislature
adopt, legislation to grant to a regional body (such as the Metropolitan Service District

or its equivalent) full power and command authority to develop, test, and implement an
effective disaster response plan for the Portland metropolitan area.
2. An effective disaster plan should mandate periodic practice drills, and such drils
should be mandated among agencies in order to insure an effective and coordinated total
response to a disaster. A continuation of neglect by some agencies toward practice drills
will only prolong the present fragmented approach to disaster planning.
3. City and county disaster plans should be amended to include full integration of
all public and private resources. The chief executives of the political jurisdictions mentioned earlier should direct their emergency services coordinators to contact private resources such as utilities, medical relief, and transportation and integrate those emergency
plans into the overall plan.
4. The state should not approve any local disaster plan that does not integrate available resources, private and public, and adjacent jurisdictions intb one overall plan.
5. No plans to establish a separate emergency command center should be developed
by Multnomah County or any other metropolitan jurisdiction.

6. All vital private agencies should be connected with Kelly Butte Command Center
through a radio network enabling them to send information and receive instructions dur-

ing a disaster response. Such a network would improve the capabilities of separate
groups to act in concert.

7. Definite arrangements should be made in advance to provide helicopter service,

should it be needed, to assemble designated key personnel at the Kelly Butte command
center in the event of a disaster.
Respectfully submitted, '"

Guthrie Baker
John S. Black

George J. Cooper III
Richard A Cox
Arne Westerman
G. Park Woodworth
R. J. (Joe) Okoneski, Chairman
"'We wish to acknowledge the help of member James Danner who participated during earlier
stages 'of this study.

Approved by the Research Board April 12, 1979 and submitted to the Board of Governors. Received by the Board of Governors May 14, 1979. Ordered printed and submitted to the membership July 9, 1979 for discussion and action on August 31, 1979.
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APPENDIX A

EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION CHART
CITY OF PORTLAND
The magnitude and nature of a disaster might require that City government be realigned in

order to more effciently cope with the situation. This chart iIustrates the initial realignment
in response to a disaster.

MAYOR
I

~

Director
of Operations *
,

Emergency S. Coordinator

City Attorney

Public Info Offcer

I

I

STAFF SECTION

Damage Analysis

EMERGENCY
SERVICES

SUPPORT
SERVICES

Law Enforcement

Procurement

Fire

Manpower

Engineering! Public

Transportation

Works

Medical Care

Communications

Red Cross! Welfare

*The Mayor may choose to appoint a Director of Operations based on the nature of the disaster, i.e. major fire, fire chief; civil disturbance, police chief; major flood, Public Works
Administrator or city engineer.

(Source: Basic Emergency Services Plan for City of Portland, Oregon, April, 1976)
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Communications

p

Damage Analysis Prop.

P

Debris Clearance

P

Directional Control

P

Emer. Procurement

P

Engineering

P

Evacuation

S

Fire Fighting

P

Flood Fighting

S S

P

p

Human Needs

p

Law Enforcement
Legal

P
P

Manpower
Medical & Health

P
P

S

Public Info

p

Radiological

P

Rescue

S

P P

Restoration of Utilities
Shelter, Medical Care

P
P

p

S

Shelter Management

P

Transportation
Warning

P
S

P S

P = Primary (Responsibility)
S =

Secondary (Responsibility)
(Source: Basic Emergency Services Plan for City of Portland, Oregon_ April, 1976)
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APPENDIX C

PERSONS INTERVIEWED
Bruce Baker, Chief of Police, City of Portland
Ginny Bass, Emergency Services Coordinator, City of Portland
Steve Bigg, Operations Supervisor, Portland International Airport

Stanley Black, M.D., retired Deputy Senior Administrative Medical Offcer,
NE Region, Scotland
Richard K. Bass, Director, Communications and Emergency Services, Clackamas CouIlty
Robert Evans, Disaster Planning Coordinator, Emergency Services Division, State of Oregon

Raymond Friedman, M.D., Disaster Communication Coordinator, H.E.A.R.
Fred Gardner, Director of Regulatory Affairs, Pacific Power & Light Co.

Myra Lee, Emergency Services Coordinator, Multnomah County
James Monahan, Assistant Division Manager, American Red Cross
Gordon Morterud, Fire Chief, City of Portland
James Murphy, Assistant Management Analyst, City of Portland, Bureau of Management
and Budget

Archie Mustard, Plans and Operation Offcer, Emergency Services Division, State of Oregon
George Nostrant, General Superintendent and Assistant Vice President,

Pacific Power and Light Company

Roy Schnaible, Portland Division Manager, Pacific Northwest Bell

Ruth Shoepe, Coordinator, Emergency Planning, Washington County
Hugh Tilson, M.D., then Medical Offcer, Multnomah County
Joseph B. Vander Veer, Jr., M.D., Director of Emergency Services, Providence Hospital
Eric P. Verheiden, Division Operations, Portland General Electric Co.

APPENDIX D

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Basic Emergency Services Plan for the City of Portland, Oregon. April, 1976.
City Club of Portland. "Emergency Care to the Injured and Stricken in the Portland Area."
Bulletin, Vol. 51, No.9, July 31, 1970.
to Establish a Comprehensive Emergency Medical Service System
McCready, Connie. Proposal
for the City of Portland and Multnomah County. September 7, 1977.
Offce of the State Fire MarshaL. Oregon State Fire Service Plan. 1974.

Oregon State Emergency Services Division. Numerous articles, disaster planning outlines,
and booklets.

Oregon Trail Chapter, American Red Cross. Disaster Plan. (undated)
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PROPOSED FOR MEMBERSHIP
If no objections are received by the Executive Secretary prior to September 7,

1979, the following applicants will be ac-

system in your building. Perhaps someone
else is getting your mail by mistake.
4) Read the back of the Bulle/in. The
announcement of the next week's pro-

cepted for membership:

gram is always there unless we do not

Gale S. Rankin, R.N. Director of Nursing Services, U of 0 Health Sciences Center. Sponsored by Elaine L. Orr.

have confirmation when we go to press.
Rarely (and we mean only 4 times in the
past five years) does a speaker cancel at
the last minute. You can rely 99 percent

Al Washington, Health Plan Manager,

Kaiser Foundation. Sponsored by Mark
Knudsen.

Janet M. Spuck, R.N., vice president,
Nursing Service, Emanuel HospitaL. Sponsored by Patricia K. Buescher.

Theodore Colombo, Director, Dept. of
External Affairs, Kaiser-Permanente Med-

of the time on the announcement of the

next week's program. Or call the Club
offce for confirmation.

5) Write to Benjamin Luscher, Post-

master for Portland. His offce is in the
Broadway & Hoyt building. (City Club
member Sid Lezak has a great letter he
would probably make available to you.)

ical Care Program. Sponsored by Mark

Perhaps an avalanche of complaints would

Knudsen.

trigger an .internal investigation of the

problem.
7) Write your Congressman.

POSTAL WOES OR,
LATE IS NEVER BETTER

8) Don't give up. If change is inevita-

ble, there is always hope. -C.T.

Your staff has received an avalanche

of complaints about late delivery of the
weekly Bulletin. Alas, there seems little
we can do to effect improvement in postal
service.

Bulletins are delivered to the main post

offce at N.W. Broadway and Hoyt each
Tuesday between 5 and 6 pm. From that
point on, delivery to your door is in the
hands of the central distribution system

and the branch post offces. Theoretically,

it should take no longer than two days for
delivery of Second Class mail, according
to post offce offcials. Since that seems

only to be theory, we offer the following
suggestions:
1) Check the address on your Bulletin
and make sure that all necessary informa-

tion is there: proper street address or box
number: room, suite or apartment number; correct zip code; company name if
necessary. If something seems amiss, call
the Club offce.

AUGUST 31: DISASTER RESPONSE
Printed in this issue of the Bulletin is
the City Club committee report on "Coor-

dination Among Agencies Involved in
Disaster Planning in the Portland Metropolitan Area." This study will be presented to the membership next Friday, August
31. by Committee Chairman R. J. Okoneski. Members wil have an opportunity
to debate and vote on the recommenda-

tions contained in the report.
In addition to discussion of the report,

we will hear from Willam H. Mayer, Director of the Disaster Response and Recovery Division of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency in Seatte. Mr. Mayer's basic responsibility is that of admin-

istering disaster relief laws in Oregon,
Washington, Idaho and Alaska. In this
capacity he coordinates activities of all
FederaL. State, local and volunteer agencies assisting in disaster relief when there

2) If your Bulletin is consistently late

is a Presidentially-declared disaster. He is

(arrives Friday, Saturday or Monday)
contact your branch post offce and find
out why it is taking so long for delivery.
Ask your mailman for assistance.

well-versed in the status of disaster re-

3) If you are in a large firm or offce

pared? Benson Hotel, Mayfair Room,

building, check with the

mail

delivery

sponse plans in Portland and Oregon, as

well as in other cities and states.

Next Week: Disaster - Are We Pre12:00 noon.

